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What difference does the teaching of civil procedure as an academic subject make to the 
practice of law, to the professional community in which lawyers practice, and to civil justice 
reform? In this article, proceduralists from Canada, England and Wales, the United States 
and Australia analyze the broader implications of teaching civil procedure as an integral 
feature of an academic legal education rather than as a part of vocational training. They 
consider ways in which the approach taken to the teaching of procedure in their legal system 
has infl uenced the evolution of the profession during a decade of increased public interest in 
the civil justice system and has had an impact on the approach taken to civil justice reform.
En quoi l’enseignement de la procédure civile comme matière théorique modifi e-t-il la 
pratique du droit, la profession d’avocat et la réforme du système de justice civil? Dans 
cet article, des spécialistes canadiens, britanniques, gallois, américains et australiens de 
la procédure analysent dans leurs grandes lignes les répercussions qu’a entraîné dans leur 
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Courts Rules Committee; Andrew Higgins is Lecturer in Civil Procedure, Faculty of 
Law, Oxford University; Th omas Rowe is Elvin R Latty Professor of Law Emeritus, Duke 
University School of Law, member, United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules, 1993–1999, consultant to the Advisory Committee, 2002 to date; Carla 
Crifò is Lecturer, University of Leicester School of Law, Leicester, United Kingdom; Lorne 
Sossin is Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School; David Bamford is Professor, Flinders University 
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pays le choix d’enseigner la procédure civile dans le cadre des études juridiques plutôt que 
dans celui de la formation professionnelle. Ils examinent la façon dont l’approche adoptée pour 
l’enseignement de la procédure civile dans leur pays a infl uencé l’évolution de la profession au 
cours d’une décennie où l’opinion publique a manifesté un intérêt accru envers les tribunaux 
civils et infl uencé l’approche adoptée pour réviser le système de justice civile.
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THE TEACHING of civil procedure as an academic subject 
make to the practice of law, to the professional community in which lawyers practice, 
and to civil justice reform? In this article, we analyze the broader implications of 
opting to teach civil procedure as an integral feature of an academic legal education 
rather than as a part of vocational training.
In previous articles in this issue,1 we described the spectrum of approaches to 
the teaching of procedure across common law systems, focussing in particular on 
1. Knutsen et al, “Th e Teaching of Procedure Across Common Law Systems” (2013) 51:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Bamford et al, “Learning the ‘How’ of the Law: Teaching Procedure 
and Legal Education” (2013) 51:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 45; Th ornburg et al, “A Community of 
Procedure Scholars: Teaching Procedure and the Legal Academy” (2013) 51:1 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 93.
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the experience in Canada, the United States, England and Wales, and Australia. To 
provide context for the current placement of the subject, we compared its history 
in each system and surveyed the various perspectives on instructors, educational 
materials, and the stage at which students are expected to study the subject. We 
then examined the implications of the diff erent approaches taken to the subject 
on the rest of the curriculum in legal education and on fostering and maintaining 
a community of scholars specializing in civil procedure.
In this article, we venture beyond the academic community to the legal 
profession and to questions of civil justice reform. Bearing in mind the diff erent 
approaches taken to teaching procedure, we examine the broad contours of the 
profession in each of the four jurisdictions mentioned above in order to identify 
possible links between the diff erent approaches that those countries take to civil 
justice reform. 
In Part I we explore the impact of the study of procedure on the practice of 
law and the state of the profession. Does it make a diff erence if all members of 
the profession have studied procedure and have done so as an academic subject? 
Alternatively, does learning the rules primarily for the purpose of practising law 
aff ect the approach taken to the way these rules are used in one’s practice? For 
example, all lawyers are expected to provide their clients with a range of options for 
dispute resolution. However, is the range of options for resolving disputes off ered by 
lawyers who have studied procedure only in a practical training program likely to be 
narrower than that off ered by those who studied procedure and dispute resolution 
fi rst when they were law students? What eff ects, if any, in the approach taken to 
professionalism and ethics may be traced to having fi rst learned these subjects in 
an academic environment? What vision of the professional community is fostered 
by the various approaches taken to the teaching of procedure?
In Part II we explore the impact of the teaching of procedure on civil justice 
reform. How is civil justice reform aff ected by being pursued within a legal 
community whose members’ understanding of procedure has been informed 
either by early academic study or by subsequent vocational training? How does the 
varying nature and extent of the understanding of procedure within a community 
aff ect the composition of the participants in civil justice reform and their approaches 
to it? Does a community’s understanding of procedure engage the profession as 
a whole and the wider public? Is it pursued as a continuous or episodic exercise? 
What advantages (or obstacles) to civil justice reform arise from the presence or 
lack of a broad understanding in the larger legal community of basic procedure 
and the way in which civil justice is administered?
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I. THE IMPACT OF THE TEACHING OF PROCEDURE ON THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION
A. CANADA: LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSION AT THE 
CROSSROADS
1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROFESSION AND LEGAL EDUCATION IN 
CANADA2
Much of the story of the legal profession and of legal education in the common 
law parts of Canada can be told through a history of a building in Toronto known 
as Osgoode Hall.3
Th e Law Society of Upper Canada was founded in 1797, a date early in 
Canadian history. At that time it had been less than two decades since Britain 
lost its American colonies in the War of Independence and less than a generation 
since it had gained control of the parts of North America that would eventually 
become Canada. In an eff ort to improve the governance of this distant outpost, 
the area had been divided into two colonies—“Upper” Canada (now Ontario)—so 
named because it was farther up the St. Lawrence River than “Lower” Canada 
(now Quebec). 
In 1791, with the creation of Upper Canada, William Osgoode was named 
the fi rst Chief Justice. And it was barely six years later that a professional body 
of lawyers called the Law Society of Upper Canada came together to provide the 
province with a “learned and honourable body, to assist their fellow subjects as 
occasion may require, and to support and maintain the constitution of the said 
Province.”4 In other parts of the world, where the legal profession is regulated by 
the state, the objective of serving the public would not seem unusual. However, the 
mandate assumed by the self-regulated Law Society of Upper Canada to “support 
and maintain the constitution of the Province” might be seen as an encroachment 
on the role of state offi  cials. Nevertheless, this central role for lawyers seemed quite 
natural to Upper Canada, and the Law Society prospered.
In 1829, the Law Society members had amassed the resources to purchase a 
sizeable property and construct a substantial building to house the law courts and to 
provide a place where they could off er classes to their students at law. Th is building 
was named Osgoode Hall after the fi rst Chief Justice. At that time, and for some 
2. Janet Walker took the lead in preparing this section.
3. John Honsberger, Osgoode Hall: An Illustrated Story (Toronto: Th e Osgoode Society for Legal 
History, 2004).
4. Law Society of Upper Canada, “History,” online: <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/with.aspx?id=427>.
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time to come, entrance to the profession was primarily through apprenticeship: 
“Students at law,” or “articled clerks,” learned the profession by working under the 
supervision of lawyers. However, beginning in the nineteenth century, the lawyers 
began to off er classroom instruction to their “students at law” to enhance the 
education they received. Th is form of education—an apprenticeship supplemented 
by classes off ered by practitioners—continued through the nineteenth century and 
into the early twentieth century. Interestingly, at one point in the late nineteenth 
century, the resources for providing these classes faltered and the students took it 
upon themselves to organize lectures on law, which they invited the members of 
the profession to provide. 
As the country expanded west and new provinces were created, some members 
of the Law Society of Upper Canada also moved west and established the governing 
bodies of the profession in the newly formed western provinces. Th ey took with 
them the perspectives on the legal profession, its role in society, the way it should 
be governed, and on legal education that they had developed in Upper Canada 
(now called Ontario).5 Th is shared history among the founders of the various 
law societies may well be credited with creating a signifi cant degree of common 
understanding among members of the profession throughout the country—one 
that has largely continued until today.
2. THE PROFESSIONAL ACCREDITATION OF LAW SCHOOLS IN ONTARIO
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the law school at Osgoode Hall was 
the only accredited provider of legal education in Ontario that was offi  cially 
recognized by the Law Society of Upper Canada. While other universities in the 
province began to off er courses and programs in law, and while students interested 
in the law were free to study at any one of them, to practise law it was necessary 
to graduate from Osgoode Hall. 
Nevertheless, considerable prestige was brought to the profession by admitting 
members who had previously studied law as an academic subject, and eventually the 
value of an academic degree to a practising lawyer was formally acknowledged. In 
1957 the Law Society decided to accredit the fi ve existing universities in Ontario 
as providers of law degrees that would be recognized as necessary pre-requisites 
to the Bar Admission Course. A decade later, an affi  liation agreement was entered 
5. Upper Canada no longer exists. In 1841, Upper and Lower Canada were united as the 
Province of Canada in a bid to better secure the governance of the colony. At that time, 
Upper Canada was renamed Canada West. In 1867, Canada West became the new province 
of Ontario when Canada ceased to be a colony and became a federation of four provinces.
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into with the newly established York University, and the law school at Osgoode 
Hall became Osgoode Hall Law School of York University (the sixth accredited 
university in Ontario). Th ereafter, only the Bar Admission Course was taught at 
“Old” Osgoode Hall.
For the next fi ve decades, relatively little changed in the relations between 
legal education and the profession. Despite the establishment of new universities, 
no new law schools were created in Ontario.6 Comparatively onerous admission 
standards were maintained for lawyers with foreign degrees who wished to be 
licensed to practise in Ontario and elsewhere in Canada. Th is kept the proportion 
of those who gained admission on the basis of a foreign degree very small. Th e 
number of places in some law schools increased over the years, but these increases 
represented relatively minor incremental changes in the overall availability of the 
places in the programs leading to the degree required for access to the profession. 
Th is maintenance of the status quo in the face of the steady increase in the population 
of Ontario and the demand for legal services had a remarkable eff ect. Th e places in 
law schools became more and more scarce, and increased competition for them 
raised the standards for applicants and, accordingly, assured that the graduating 
students entering the profession were highly talented and motivated in their 
chosen profession.  
Th e inherent talent of the cohort of law students and the extent to which 
they value their opportunity to practise law may be no guarantee of the ease of 
regulating them as members of the profession, but it would seem reasonable to 
believe that there could be some correlation. Accordingly, as the overall quality 
and commitment of the entrants to the profession increased, it was unlikely that 
a reason for reviewing the eff ectiveness of the profession’s regulation in Ontario 
would emerge.
3. THE EMERGENCE OF A PROFESSION OF PARALEGALS AND THEIR 
REGULATION
As places in law schools became scarcer and demands for legal services increased, 
the quality of the services provided was not likely to be an issue of concern for 
regulators. However, quality is only one aspect of concern in the provision of 
legal services. Two other key aspects of the provision were not addressed by the 
evolution of this model over time: the availability and the cost of legal services. 
With proportionately fewer lawyers to provide legal services—lawyers whose 
6. It would not be feasible to establish a law school without accreditation. 
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heightened abilities and aspirations brought corresponding increases in career 
expectations—the availability of aff ordable legal services was bound to decline. 
Th e response to this need, particularly in an era in which information about 
the law and the justice system was more readily available to the public, was an 
increase in the provision of legal services by paralegals. Paralegals initially acted 
independently and without the supervision of lawyers. In an area that is otherwise 
regulated, the provision of services in the absence of regulation raises obvious 
concerns. A range of responses could be imagined to address these concerns. One 
might expect to see the imposition of limits on the services that such service 
providers are permitted to provide, and one might expect this to be combined 
with no regulation, government regulation, or self-regulation. None of these 
responses were adopted in Ontario. Instead, in 2007, the Law Society Act was 
amended to make the Law Society of Upper Canada responsible for regulating 
the paralegal profession.7
It is worth pausing here to note that the regulation of the legal profession in 
Canada is unusual. In many civil law countries, the profession is regulated by the 
state, and the promotion of the welfare of the members of the profession is typically 
undertaken by provincial associations. Th e separation of these functions is thought 
to be an important safeguard against the potential confl ict between these roles. By 
contrast, in many common law countries the profession is self-regulating. Th e courts 
usually oversee admission to the bar, and this is thought to be an important safeguard 
against the potential for confl icts brought about by state regulation of lawyers. But, 
the standards for professional conduct and the maintenance of discipline are usually 
the responsibility of particular departments of the local bar association.
In Canada, as in other jurisdictions, the voices of the profession—the bodies 
that promote the welfare of the members of the profession—are the Federal and 
provincial bar associations. Th e bar associations are vigorous supporters of the 
interests of the profession. However, unlike other jurisdictions, the bar associations 
neither license nor discipline lawyers. Apart from the role that they play in continuing 
legal education, these associations have relatively little to do with the academic 
degree program necessary for admission to the profession. 
In Canada, it is the provincial law societies, not the bar associations, that 
license lawyers and set and maintain standards of professional conduct. Th e law 
societies serve these functions as bodies that are independent of the state and the 
7. For the amending statutory provisions, see Access to Justice Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, Sched 
C, s 19. For the current statutory provisions, see Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c L.8, ss 
25.1-25.2.
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courts and, moreover, are independent of the role of advocating on behalf of the 
profession. While Canada is typical of other common law countries in having a 
self-regulated legal profession, the regulators—the law societies—are not also the 
advocates for the interests of the profession. Rather, the law societies regulate on 
behalf of the public. While the regulators in civil law countries are usually not 
independent of government, and the regulators in common law countries are not 
independent of the profession, in Canada the regulators are independent of both. 
Th is unique role may well have contributed to the confi dence of the Law 
Society of Upper Canada when it took on the responsibility of regulating paralegals 
in Ontario. In the initiatives taken to address the need for paralegal regulation, 
a standing committee comprised of paralegals and members of the Law Society’s 
governing board established the regulatory framework, together with Rules of 
Conduct and an application process. Th e immediate results have been that, apart 
from specifi ed exemptions, anyone providing legal services in Ontario, whether a 
lawyer or a paralegal, is subject to licensing requirements; and the Law Society is 
authorized to educate and license paralegals and to regulate their conduct. 
Th e larger implications for the profession, however, are profound. With the 
rise of paralegals, a key feature of the role of the professional community of lawyers 
in the larger community (i.e., their monopoly on the provision of legal services) 
was at risk of disappearing. Th e introduction of paralegal regulation in Ontario 
did not, however, undermine the centrality of the legal profession, but instead 
re-affi  rmed and even strengthened it. Unlike the situation in the United States, in 
Ontario, paralegals may provide certain legal services without the supervision of 
lawyers. However, they do so under the regulation of the Law Society. Th us, the 
amended regulatory framework in which these legal services are provided, whether 
by lawyers or by paralegals, has preserved the central place of the professional 
community of lawyers in the justice system.
Can a link be drawn between these developments and the ongoing exposure of 
law students to current issues and debates concerning the civil justice system and the 
provision of legal services through the inclusion of a required course on civil procedure 
in the law school curriculum? Th e profession demonstrated considerable fl exibility and 
adaptability that enabled it to retain a central role in the provision of legal services in the 
face of important changes in the demands for legal services. Could this be attributed to 
the universal engagement by members of the profession with the broader issues of civil 
justice at the academic stage of their preparation for the profession? It may be diffi  cult 
to demonstrate such a link in any conclusive way. However, comparison with recent 
experience in other jurisdictions, notably England and Wales, as discussed in a later 
section of this article, suggests that such a connection might not be purely speculative.
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B. ACCREDITATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN CANADA8
Th e rise of paralegals in the provision of legal services has not been the only 
signifi cant change in the structure of the profession in recent years that might 
suggest the signifi cance of the role of teaching civil procedure as an academic 
subject. Another such development has related to the formal requirements for legal 
education as a necessary prerequisite to admission to the profession.  
As mentioned, the provincial and territorial law societies of Canada have the 
statutory responsibility to regulate Canada’s legal profession in the public interest. 
Th is responsibility includes admitting lawyers to the profession, stipulating the 
articling requirement, setting bar admission examinations and courses, overseeing 
continuing professional development and quality, regulating professional discipline 
and, if necessary, removing lawyers from the profession. In all common law 
provinces and territories there are three requirements for admission to the bar: a 
Canadian law degree or its equivalent, successful completion of a bar admission 
or licensing program, and completion of an apprenticeship known as articling. 
For applicants who receive their legal training outside Canada, the determination 
of what constitutes qualifi cations equivalent to a Canadian law degree is made by 
the National Committee on Accreditation, a committee of the Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada (FLSC).
In Canada, until quite recently, no national standards or academic requirements 
for a law degree were ever developed. Th e closest de facto standard was a brief two-page 
outline of requirements, which the Law Society of Upper Canada approved in 1957 
and revised in 1969. Th is outline included a list of compulsory courses, among 
which was Civil Procedure. Th ese requirements have only recently been reviewed 
and, although they were informally adopted in other provinces, they were never 
formally approved by other law societies. Furthermore, unlike the situation in the 
United States, in Canada until recently there has never been any formal review of 
the degree programs of accredited law schools to determine whether they merit 
continued accreditation. Th is brief outline of required components for an accredited 
law degree refl ected a workable balance between regulatory and academic priorities, 
and it aff orded to the law schools the necessary fl exibility for them to innovate 
in response to changing needs. For example, in the case of civil procedure, the 
current content of the required course and the approach to its objectives bear little 
relation to those of its counterparts in the 1950s and 1960s.9 Concentration on 
8. Lorne Sossin took the lead in preparing this section.
9. Knutsen et al, supra note 1 at 14.  
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the technical details of the rules and the practice of civil litigation has long since 
given way to a broader consideration of the various contexts in which they operate.
Nevertheless, in 2006, after nearly a half-century without any new law schools 
in Ontario, the pressure to expand the positions for students in accredited programs 
led to applications for accreditation or expressions of interest from a number of 
new universities.10 A number of provinces also enacted legislation respecting access 
to regulated professions that required regulators to ensure that admission processes 
for domestic- and internationally-trained applicants were transparent, objective, 
impartial, and fair. Further, the number of internationally-trained applicants for 
entry to bar admission programs in Canadian common law jurisdictions11 was 
on the rise. Th e standard for such applicants is that they have legal education 
equivalent to the requirements for a Canadian common law degree, which 
highlighted the need to delineate those requirements. Finally, the federal and 
provincial governments made clear their commitment to national labour 
mobility and harmonized standards, underscoring the national dimension 
of this concern. A 2007 Canadian Competition Bureau study on regulated 
professions explicitly questioned the justifi cation for variations in admissions 
requirements between law societies.12
Th e FLSC created a Task Force, which generated signifi cant controversy from 
the start. Many academics and legal educators viewed its activities as a threat to 
academic freedom and institutional autonomy, while lawyers from across the 
country weighed in on what might be deemed to be the essential elements of 
a lawyer’s training. Some lawyers also expressed the concern that this initiative 
would download or offl  oad the responsibility for professional training from law 
societies to law schools.13 Th e Council of Canadian Law Deans (CCLD) were 
concerned to ensure that a national requirement would preserve the fl exibility 
that Canadian law schools required to continue to innovate in legal education to 
position graduates for valuable and diverse roles in society. Th e CCLD opposed 
the imposition of required competencies,14 and some law schools also voiced their 
10. Including Lakehead University, Wilfred Laurier University, Laurentian University, and the 
University of Waterloo.
11. Th at is, all provinces and territories outside of Québec.
12. Government of Canada, Competition Bureau, Self-Regulated Professions: Balancing 
competition and regulation (2007) at 65, online: <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/
site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Professions-study-fi nal-E.pdf/$FILE/Professions-study-fi nal-E.pdf>.
13. For a discussion of some of the reaction to the Final Report, see Jean Sorenson, “Setting the 
Standard” Canadian Lawyer (Fall 2010), online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/
Setting-the-standard.html>.
14. Th e CCLD submission read in part: 
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opposition.15 In addition, an ad-hoc group of legal academics held a symposium 
on the Task Force and issued their own submission raising concerns that the Task 
Force was proceeding without suffi  cient evidence and understanding of the nature 
and diversity of legal education.16
Despite this controversy, in October 2009 the FLSC released their Task Force’s 
Final Report.17 Th e Task Force recommended that the FLSC adopt a national 
academic requirement for entry to the bar admission programs of the common 
law jurisdictions. Th e rationale for developing a requirement that applies equally 
to applicants educated in Canada and internationally is to ensure that all those 
seeking to enter bar admission programs in Canadian common law jurisdictions 
have demonstrated certain essential and predefi ned competencies in the academic 
portion of their legal education.
Th e FLSC observed that accrediting bodies in peer jurisdictions use one of two 
approaches to determine whether an applicant for admission meets the necessary 
academic requirements: either successful completion of specifi ed courses or passage 
of a substantive law bar examination. Th e Task Force noted what it took to be an 
increasing focus on learning outcomes rather than prescriptive input requirements.18 
It proposed a national requirement expressed in terms of competencies in basic skills, 
awareness of appropriate ethical values, and core legal knowledge that law students 
can reasonably be expected to have acquired during the academic component of 
In general terms, CCLD is of the view that the current situation, where Canadian law schools 
enjoy a margin of maneuver to set those requirements, subject to the general policies of their 
universities, produces satisfactory results. While the requirements imposed by each law school 
are broadly similar, we note that the liberty they currently enjoy is used to tailor their programs 
to specifi c situations or to implement initiatives that are designed to respond to the increasingly 
diverse needs of the legal profession. Th ere is no evidence that this fl exibility threatens the pro-
tection of the public in any way. Accordingly, we would urge the task force not to recommend 
the adoption of any stringent standards with respect to those issues.
 See Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Task Force on the Canadian Common Law 
Degree, Final Report (October 2009) at 38-39, Appendix 6, online: <http://www.fl sc.
ca/_documents/Common-Law-Degree-Report-C(1).pdf>. Lorne Sossin was a member of the 
CCLD at the time of the submission.
15. Th is group of law schools included Osgoode Hall Law School, whose Faculty Council passed 
a motion opposing the initiative in the spring of 2009.
16. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14 at 47. 
17. See generally Ibid. See also Sorenson, supra note 13.
18. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14 at 4. Th e Task Force appeared to be 
infl uenced in particular by a report by the Carnegie Foundation. See William M Sullivan 
et al, “Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law” Carnegie Foundation 
for the Advancement of Teaching (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2007), online: <http://www.
carnegiefoundation.org/publications/educating-lawyers-preparation-profession-law>.
(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL166
their education. Th e recommendations were adopted by each of the provincial 
and territorial law societies in the spring of 2010. Subject to the recommendations 
of an implementation committee struck in the summer of 2010, new entrants to 
the Bar would fall under this scheme commencing in 2015.19
Th ere are three areas of required competencies. Th e fi rst area of competency 
is skills-based, which includes problem solving, the ability to conduct research, 
and the ability to communicate orally and in writing in one of the two offi  cial 
languages, as these skills would be relevant to legal practice.20 Th e second area 
of competency relates to an awareness and understanding of ethics and the legal 
profession, which must be provided in a stand-alone course. Th e third area of 
competency relates to substantive legal knowledge21 of the foundations of law,22 
the public law of Canada,23 and private law principles.24 In listing the substantive 
competencies, the Task Force emphasized that these are competencies, not courses, 
and that law students should be able to satisfy them in a number of ways that 
may diff er from competency to competency and from law school to law school. 
However, the FLSC expressly indicated that civil procedure, one of the formerly 
required courses, would not be included as a required competency:
Th e Federation has deleted civil procedure as a required competency. It is important 
for law students to understand the principles that govern the resolution of disputes 
in the Canadian common law system; it is not essential for them to learn specifi c 
19. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14.
20. In general the Task Force recommends that the FLSC leave it to law schools to determine 
how their graduates accomplish the required competencies. Th e Task Force justifi ed the 
requirement of a stand-alone course for ethics and professionalism because they “lie at the 
core of the legal profession. It is important that students begin to appreciate this early in their 
legal education.” Ibid at 4. However, the FLSC did not stipulate any particular pedagogy for 
such a course, or whether it is taught in a descriptive, normative, or expressly critical fashion.
21. In determining the required substantive legal knowledge, the Task Force considered the 
continued relevance of the current fi rst-year curriculum of the sixteen Canadian law schools 
off ering a common law degree, the importance of students having foundational knowledge 
in both public and private law, the competency research undertaken by various law societies 
in Canada, the regulatory approach in other comparable common law jurisdictions, and 
the importance of ensuring that the requirements do not interfere with the fl exibility and 
innovation in current law school education.
22. Th is includes principles of common law and equity, the process of statutory construction and 
analysis, and the administration of the law in Canada.
23. Th is includes constitutional law (including federalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms), human rights principles, the rights of Aboriginal peoples of Canada, Canadian 
criminal law, and the principles of Canadian administrative law.
24. Th is includes contracts, torts, property law, and legal and fi duciary concepts in commercial 
relationships.
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practice rules in law school. Students should be exposed to the principles while 
learning the foundations of common law.25
Th e reasons for removing civil procedure from the list of “core” courses are 
not entirely clear. While it was formerly included among the list of courses that are 
now captured in a list of “substantive legal knowledge” competencies, it is clearly 
diff erent from them. It is understandable, therefore, that it would be thought 
suitable to be captured in the heading “foundations of common law.” Moreover, 
it may not have been obvious to the Task Force that topics such as “ethics and 
professionalism” are currently taught in context in the course on procedure. In 
this way, the newly added requirement of a stand-alone course on ethics and 
professionalism may wind up capturing in some measure the discussions currently 
pursued in the stand-alone civil procedure course. In this sense, there are larger, 
systemic reasons that might provide more compelling explanations for the apparent 
elimination of procedure as a required course. To the extent that “civil procedure” 
no longer comprises a detailed study of the technicalities of the rules, as it once 
did, a formal acknowledgment that such a course is outmoded simply operates to 
give offi  cial sanction to the current curriculum. Otherwise, the proposal would 
seem to be misguided.
Despite the signifi cant evolution in the law school curriculum in other areas 
over the decades, Canadian law schools around the country have continued to teach 
civil procedure, with a number of these schools folding it into a broader course on 
“Legal Process,” which also introduces students to alternative dispute resolution 
and other forms of legal process (e.g., public inquiries) and some schools off er it 
as an upper year course. Given the signifi cant evolution—even to the point of 
changing the name of the course—there is no indication that the persistence of 
the course is a result of a perfunctory sense of obligation to adhere to the original 
list of required courses. Civil procedure remains more widely taught than some 
areas that are slated to become required competencies, such as fi duciary duties in 
commercial settings, under the FLSC standards. 
It might not be obvious to those from outside Canada why civil procedure is 
taught instead of criminal procedure, why one court’s rules are taught rather than 
another (e.g., the Federal Court, provincial Family Courts, Small Claims Courts, 
et cetera), and why litigation is emphasized in the face of the rise of other forms 
of dispute resolution. Despite this, and despite the varying contours of the course 
in terms of topics and teaching formats, the teaching of procedure has remained 
a substantial feature of every law school curriculum in Canada. Perhaps ubiquitous 
25. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, supra note 14, Appendix 5.
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familiarity with the core content of the course caused it to be taken for granted—just 
as the formal study of English grammar might seem superfl uous to educators in 
Anglophone countries. Indeed, the FLSC’s prescribed competencies include “an 
awareness of the importance of professionalism in dealing with clients, other 
counsel, judges, court staff  and members of the public.”26 Such awareness would 
be possible only with a basic understanding of the litigation process. Indeed, much 
of “ethics and professionalism” would seem abstract if it were studied without 
reference to the litigation process.
In the end, the FLSC competencies are unlikely to have a signifi cant impact 
on the approach taken in well-established law schools to the teaching of procedure. 
Th e FLSC Task Force’s Final Report prescribed competencies, not courses, and the 
traditional course on civil procedure has long been left behind in many law 
schools in favour of a broader introduction to civil justice and dispute resolution. 
It remains to be seen whether there will be any eff ect of the implicit suggestion 
that the teaching of procedure be infused in various required courses throughout 
the curriculum, rather than taught as an independent subject. Nevertheless, this 
suggestion highlights how attending to the experience of the impact of teaching 
procedure in other legal systems might give valuable context and perspective to 
the value of identifying procedure as a discrete subject at this important juncture 
in the history of legal education in Canada.
C. ENGLAND AND WALES: THE STORY OF THE LEGAL SERVICES ACT (THE 
ACADEMY AND THE PROFESSION—WORLDS APART)27
Th e teaching of procedure in England and its relationship to the legal profession 
can be sharply contrasted with the situations in Canada and the United States. 
Whereas in the United States top law schools may boast about the quality of their 
procedure scholars, such scholars are less common in England and tend to live in 
the shadows of their more illustrious private law colleagues working in property 
or contract, for example, or public law scholars working in the fi elds of human 
rights or criminal law. English procedure scholars usually spend most of their 
time teaching subjects other than procedure because so few law schools include 
procedure on the syllabus, either as a core subject or as an optional subject. 
In contrast to Ontario, where to gain the right to practice law once required 
passing through a building known as Osgoode Hall, in England there have been 
no clear paths to practice, let alone a single path. Even today, many English 
lawyers have not studied law at university, but found their way into practice after 
26. Ibid at 9.
27. Andrew Higgins took the lead in preparing this section.
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studying other subjects. Th is phenomenon has a long history. According to David 
Lemmings, in the eighteenth century “there was no clear uniform pattern” as to 
how one became a barrister, which caused confusion amongst aspiring barristers 
and their families. Some favoured a preparatory spell at the university, some were 
apprenticed to attorneys, some paid to spend a period in the offi  ce of a special 
pleader, and some formed debating clubs with their fellow students. All would 
have grappled with introductory primers and reports in their chambers and would 
have visited Westminster Hall to observe barristers in action.28 
 Th e university option rarely included law, which was looked down upon as 
a purely practical or mechanical art. In an opening lecture at Oxford as the fi rst 
Vinerian Professor of the Laws of England, William Blackstone introduced his 
subject in an apologetic fashion: “[Th e study of law] has generally been reputed 
(however unjustly) of a dry and unfruitful nature; and of which the theoretical, 
elementary parts have hitherto received a very moderate share of cultivation.”29 
While the study of law at University may no longer be viewed as a “dry and disgusting 
study,”30 alternative routes to practice remain popular in England. Some of England’s 
best known judges in the twentieth century studied subjects other than law. Th e 
most popular subject for future Law Lords was classics. Th ose who studied law 
often did it as a second degree, and some never set foot in a law school.31
Th is background poses considerable challenges for any fruitful discussion of 
the relationship between the teaching of a particular subject, such as procedure, and 
professional attitudes in England. Even if the teaching of procedure were common 
in law schools32 it would be diffi  cult to speculate about its eff ect on the profession 
because many members of the profession in England have bypassed the study of 
law at university altogether, whether as a fi rst or second degree.
Th e limited or non-existent treatment of civil procedure in the curriculum 
of law degrees around the country might suggest, according to this article’s title, 
that English lawyers and judges do not critically engage with procedural issues as 
much as we would like. To the extent that this is a reasonable hypothesis—and 
there is plenty of anecdotal evidence to support it—it may be the product of a 
self-perpetuating mythology. Procedure is only taught at the vocational training 
28. David Lemmings, Professors of the Law: Barristers and English Legal Culture in the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 108.
29. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England (delivered 25 October 1758), s 1.
30. Lemmings, supra note 28 at 131.
31. Tom Bingham, “Th e Law Lords: Who has Served” in Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson & 
Gavin Drewry, eds, Th e Judicial House of Lords 1867–2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) 122 at 123.
32. And it is not. See Erik S Knutsen et al, supra note 1.
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stage of legal education. Th erefore, like the study of law itself three hundred years 
ago, it is viewed as a mechanical and technical discipline only. 
 Th e view that procedure is not a subject worthy of academic study may also 
be partly attributable to the structure of the English legal profession. Practice and 
procedure has traditionally been the domain of solicitors, a branch of the profession 
that was populated by lawyers who were considered to be of a lower class (intellectually 
and perhaps even socially) than barristers. As advocates, barristers needed an excellent 
working knowledge of the rules of evidence (a subject that enjoys a higher profi le 
at many English law schools) whereas issues of procedure could be left to solicitors.
It may be diffi  cult to draw any fi rm links between, on the one hand, the 
teaching of procedure and professional attitudes towards the subject and, on the 
other hand, the importance of the teaching of procedure to legal thought and 
the administration of justice. Even qualitative surveys have inherent limitations. 
However, even if many practitioners consider procedure to be a technical subject 
with little intellectual substance, this view is not shared by the judiciary. Major 
judge-led reviews and reforms of the English Civil Justice system have engaged 
strongly with academic scholarship on procedure. Th ese include Lord Woolf ’s 
access to justice review in the mid-1990s33 and Sir Rupert Jackson’s review of civil 
litigation costs in 2009.34
Interest in procedure scholarship by English judges is not surprising. Judges are 
in large part responsible for the effi  cacy and fairness of the system as a whole, and 
hence they are likely to have a keen interest in the systemic values and constraints 
that are the subject of much procedure scholarship. By way of illustration, judges 
of the higher courts in England, including the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords (now the Supreme Court) have often engaged with the research of Adrian 
Zuckerman, Professor of Civil Procedure at the University of Oxford, endorsing 
his account of a procedural rule35 or going out of their way to explain why they 
have not adopted an interpretation of a rule advocated by him.36
A critical development worth noting is that the legal profession in England is 
in the process of potentially radical change. Th e Legal Services Act37 overhauled the 
33. Th e Right Honourable Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (July 1996), online: <http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/fi nal/index.htm>.
34. Lord Justice Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (May 2009), 
online: <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2fDocuments%2fReports%2fj ackson-fi nal-
report-140110.pdf>.
35. Th ree Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England, 
[2004] UKHL 48 at para 34, [2005] 1 AC 610.
36. C plc v P & Anor, [2008] Ch 1, [2007] 3 All ER 1034 (CA). 
37. Legal Services Act 2007 (UK), c 29.
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regulation of lawyers and in key respects de-regulated the profession with a view 
to promoting greater competition amongst legal service providers and greater 
access to justice. Th e reforms were driven by a belief that self-regulation of the 
profession was inappropriate and that self-regulation had demonstrably failed to 
deliver competent aff ordable legal assistance and access to justice to many people. 
In explaining the reforms, the Lord Chancellor stated his belief that this unsatisfactory 
position was not the product of the legal education system, but the structure of the 
profession. He stated: 
Th e British legal system’s excellent reputation and education, which will produce 
our next generation of brilliant lawyers, must be allowed to fl ourish. 
But there are some real risks facing the legal profession. Th e risk that, under the 
current structure and regulations, too many consumers are being failed.
Pure self-regulation is not inspiring suffi  cient confi dence among clients. People are 
not convinced by bodies who act as both the team manager and the referee.
And people cannot get legal advice in the way they often need it most. People don’t 
want to have to traipse between fi rms, chambers, advice centres - getting piecemeal 
help from each. Whether it’s housing, insurance, or representation in a court issue, 
clients want a seamless service from their providers.38
In 2007, the Law Society’s dual functions of regulator and union were split, 
and the regulatory framework was overhauled so that regulation is now focused 
on a set of “reserved legal activities,” which presently include advocacy, conducting 
litigation, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, notarial activities, and 
the administration of oaths.39 Such services can be provided only by authorized 
persons. Th ere are presently eight “approved regulators” who have the power to 
grant such authorization.40 Interestingly, the dispute resolution-related activities 
among these services are those that have traditionally been within the purview 
of barristers. In that sense, the barristers—the lawyers whose primary functions 
relate to trial practice—have retained their monopoly whereas the solicitors—the 
38. Lord Chancellor, “Legal Services Reform” (Speech delivered at the St Paul Traveler’s 
Conference: On Risk, Haberdasher’s Hall London, 8 June 2005) [copy on fi le with the 
author].  
39. Legal Services Act 2007, supra note 37, s 12.
40. Th ese are Th e Law Society, Th e Bar Council, Th e Master of the Faculties, Th e Council for 
Licensed Conveyancers, Th e Institute of Legal Executives, Th e Chartered Institute of Patent 
Agents, Th e Institute of Trade Mark Attorneys and Th e Association of Law Costs Draftsmen. 
Th e regulatory arm of these bodies must be separated from the representative arm.
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lawyers who would eff ectively be the face of civil justice to the general public in 
non-litigious matters and disputes in the pre-trial phase—have lost theirs. Th ese 
legal services, including many types of advice work, are not now regulated as legal 
services at all. Th ese include employment advice, welfare and benefi ts guidance, 
and will-writing services.41 Nothing prevents any new fi rm or individual from 
off ering these services to the general public.
In addition, the Legal Services Act facilitated an expansion in the number and 
types of businesses that can apply for authorization to provide reserved legal services, 
and permits lawyers to enter into partnerships with other service providers, such 
as accountants, fi nancial advisors, or management consultants. Th e Legal Services 
Act also allows partial or external ownership of legal practices, enabling general 
businesses, such as banks or supermarkets, to set up legal divisions, which provide 
legal services to their customers.42 Th e intention was that the “Tesco Law” concept43 
and multi-disciplinary partnerships with providers of services other than legal 
advice will reduce the cost of legal services and allow clients to obtain a seamless 
service from their providers. One of the major advocates of these reforms has been 
the Offi  ce of Fair Trading, which, along with its predecessor, has been arguing for 
much greater competition in the legal profession for decades. In 2001, it produced 
a report on Competition in Professions in which it stated that “the professions are 
run by producers largely on behalf of producers.”44
It may be diffi  cult to determine whether a causal relationship can be drawn between 
the way the English legal system reached this point and the legal profession’s view of 
the importance of promoting access to justice and of learning about procedure as 
an academic subject. Arguably, an absence of procedure as an academic discipline 
may have contributed to the profession’s loss of public confi dence and the widening 
gap between law in books and law in action. A self-regulating profession, whose 
engagement with debates about procedural values and systemic constraints was 
limited, was seemingly unable or unwilling to move with the times and respond 
to the changing needs of the public or even engage in a discussion about what 
those needs are and how they could best be met.
Had there been a tradition of academic study of procedure, it might have 
contributed to enlightened thinking that could disrupt the profession’s vested 
41. If lawyers are regulated because of their title—solicitor, barrister, notary, et cetera—then they 
are bound by general codes of conduct when they undertake this so called unreserved work.
42. Known as alternative business structures under the statute. See Legal Services Act 2007, supra 
note 37, Part 5.
43. Named after British supermarket chain Tesco.
44. John Vickers, “Competition in the Professions” Th e Offi  ce of Fair Trading (March 2001) at 
para 10, online: <www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/professional_bodies/oft328.pdf>.
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interest in maintaining a closed shop and cost rules permitting lawyers to either 
charge fees by the hour without an upper limit regardless of the outcome of the 
dispute or double their hourly fee as a success premium when operating on a 
conditional fee basis.45 In this way, the intransigence of the profession (whether 
caused by a narrow approach lacking in foresight or otherwise) may have ironically 
prompted de-regulation based on market-oriented procedure research, which looks 
at increasing the number of ways consumers can access the system. It is clear, in 
any event, that the legal profession has changed. Legal service providers operate 
in new forms and are subject to new pressures and confl icts, which in turn are 
generating new problems for the administration of justice. Th ese developments 
will warrant close study by procedure scholars.46
D. THE UNITED STATES: THE ROLE OF THE BAR IN GOVERNANCE AND IN 
SETTING EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS47
According to an old proverb, if you want a description of water, do not ask a 
fi sh. Similarly, a typical legal educator in the United States may not know how to 
answer the question of whether it is possible to trace a link between the teaching of 
procedure and the state of the profession. Legal education and the legal profession 
in the United States have always been highly integrated in a far more defi nitive 
way than they have been in Canada. Th is section describes the nature of that 
integration and its implications for legal education and for the legal profession. 
1. THE GOVERNANCE OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Th e study of law in the United States did not begin as an academic subject but as 
a response to a public concern about professional competence and the standards 
of the practising bar. Dissatisfi ed with the results achieved by the informal learning 
derived from the practice of having young lawyers become apprentices to established 
members of the legal profession, lawyers sought to improve the knowledge and skills 
of new members of the profession by creating law schools in the mid-nineteenth 
century and by instituting examinations as part of the process of being admitted 
to the bar. Perhaps even more signifi cantly than this, the concern to maintain 
public confi dence in the competence of lawyers brought about the creation of the 
45. Th ese costs rules were one of the main subjects of Jackson’s review and came in for stinging 
criticism. See Jackson, supra note 34 at ch 10. 
46. Legal Services Board, “Market impacts of the Legal Services Act 2007 - Baseline Report 
(Final) 2012, para 1.17
47. Janet Walker took the lead in preparing this section.
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American Bar Association (ABA) in 1878. Since that time, the ABA has played 
an integral role in shaping the law school curriculum.
Th e distinction between the US and Canadian models of professional 
regulation in respect of legal education is subtle but signifi cant. In both countries, 
the professional association and the body responsible for admitting new members 
are separate entities. In Ontario, for example, the body responsible for the regulation 
of the profession is the Law Society of Upper Canada (a body that, as mentioned 
above, is independent of both the government and the judiciary) and the body 
responsible for the welfare of the profession is the Ontario Bar Association, which 
is affi  liated with the Canadian Bar Association and the bar associations of the 
other provinces. Similarly, in New York, for example, the New York State Board 
of Law Examiners (operating under the auspices of the New York State Court of 
Appeals) is responsible for administering the bar examination to candidates seeking 
admission to practise law in the State of New York. 
However, the relationship that the regulators and the professional associations 
bear to professional discipline and to legal education in Canada and the United 
States is diff erent. In Canada, the regulators (the law societies) have primary 
responsibility for professional discipline and for setting the standards for the legal 
education required for admission to the bar, whereas in the United States, the 
professional association (the ABA) has primary responsibility for maintaining 
professional and educational standards. 
One other diff erence is noteworthy. In addition to completing an apprentice 
year (articles) and successfully completing the bar admission examination, until 
recently the Law Society of Upper Canada required each new member to take a 
Bar Admission Course of roughly half a year because it ceded the responsibility 
for providing more academic instruction to the faculties of law of the universities. 
In this way, the regulator was in a position to use instruction and examination to 
ensure that lawyers had the minimum level of required competence and was content 
to maintain a more relaxed attitude to the practical relevance of the teaching and 
learning involved in obtaining the basic law degree. 
In contrast, the main requirement for entrance to the profession after obtaining 
an accredited law degree in the United States is successful completion of the bar 
admission exams. To be sure, many applicants take commercially provided bar 
preparation courses, but neither the profession nor the state government nor the 
judiciary have responsibility to provide or oversee any further education or 
training in the classroom or on the job. Accordingly, the keen interest of the 
profession in playing a direct role in shaping legal education in the context 
of the basic law degree, and the profession’s direct responsibility to the public 
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for ensuring that the basic law degree equips members of the profession to 
practise in a way that will not require the ABA to discipline misconduct, is as 
clear today in the United States as it was a century and a half ago when the 
law schools were fi rst created.
It is little wonder, then, that the question of whether a link can be drawn 
between legal education, legal practice, and the state of the profession is puzzling 
to Americans. Th e body responsible for establishing and maintaining the academic 
standards of the basic law school curriculum for accredited law schools is also 
responsible for advocating for and regulating the standards of the legal profession 
on behalf of the public.
2. ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING STANDARDS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION
In sharp contrast with the long history of minimalist standards for legal education in 
Canada, in the United States the process of establishing and maintaining standards for 
legal education is extensive and the standards themselves are detailed and comprehensive. 
Any law school wishing to gain or maintain accreditation for its program must 
comply with the standards established by the ABA.48 Each law school must provide 
the ABA with an annual questionnaire, self-study, site evaluation questionnaire, and 
any other information required by the Accreditation Committee and Council. Th ere 
are detailed protocols for the annual site visits, including the preparations that should 
be made, the conduct of the visit, and the format of the report. Th ere is extensive and 
ongoing discussion and consultation over the details of the standards and the methods 
by which they are assessed, and there is lively debate over the objectives of the standards 
and whether they are appropriately framed. As may be expected, issues about whether 
the best features of legal education can be reduced to specifi c criteria and whether their 
provision in a given law school can be evaluated accurately in objectively measurable 
ways are discussed with interest.
In addition to the routine engagement between the ABA and legal educators, 
there are, from time to time, periods of more fundamental refl ection on the purposes 
of legal education and the possible need for fundamental reforms. One example 
of this was the 1992 “Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
48. See American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 
“Accreditation,” online: <www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/
accreditation.html>. Th ese standards are reviewed by the US Department of Education but 
the ABA is the recognized accrediting agency.
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Narrowing the Gap.”49 Th is report, and the scholarly debate surrounding it,50 
refl ects a continuing engagement embedded in the culture of legal education over 
the tension between the role of legal education in equipping graduates for a 
successful career in practice and in fostering their intellectual curiosity about 
the law. 
Th is debate has many striking features. Perhaps most notable is that it plays out 
within the law school and the legal academy, and not between the legal academy 
and the legal profession. Th e tension between rigorous professional training and 
scholarly exploration of larger themes is regarded as an integral feature of legal 
education—a question that permeates both the broad contours of curricular design 
and the specifi c features of course content and pedagogical method. However, the 
implications of this tension are also telling. Accepting the centrality of the tension 
means accepting the signifi cance of the role played by legal educators who specialize 
in areas that are relevant to practice. It also means encouraging all legal educators to 
have regard for the aspects of their concentration areas that are relevant to practice. 
Over time, it also arguably promotes a career path for legal educators in which 
pre-law pursuits in other academic fi elds are prized and post-graduate pursuits are 
more often directed at further study of law and clerkships rather than practice. 
It might be imagined that a limited interest in post-graduate legal studies would 
undermine the legal academy’s capacity to produce groundbreaking scholarship. 
However, the reverse seems to be true. Th e close relationship between legal education 
and the profession in a legal system in which legal practice is a prominent and popular 
career aspiration fuels the demand for legal academics, thereby increasing the scale 
and energy of academic engagement on questions of law. Moreover, coupled with 
an economic model in which law schools are supported primarily by tuition fees and 
private donors, the competition between them to recruit better faculty and students, and 
generally to enhance the standing of the law school and support the career aspirations 
of their students, drives up the standards for scholarship so that the ABA standards are 
readily met in most institutions. All in all, the close relationship between the study and 
49. American Bar Association, Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, “Report 
of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap” Legal Education 
and Professional Development – An Educational Continuum (July 1992), online: <http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_
education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).authcheckdam.pdf>. Th is 
report has come to be known as the “McCrate Report.”
50. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing 
from the MacCrate Report–Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being” (1994) 69:3 
Wash L Rev 593; Roy T Stuckey, “Education for the Practice of Law: Th e Times Th ey Are-A-
Changin’” (1996) 75:4 Nebraska L Rev 648.
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practice of law in the United States makes the implications for both so pervasive that 
it could well be hard to know where to begin or end in describing them.
E. AUSTRALIA: AN INCREASING INTEREST IN PROCEDURE AS AN 
ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE51
Th e origins of the Australian legal system and profession lie in the structures, practices, 
and procedures of early nineteenth-century England. Until the mid-nineteenth century 
the pathway into legal practice was through a form of apprenticeship. Prospective 
lawyers would receive workplace training as articled clerks. Th e delivery of legal 
education was undertaken by the legal profession and admission to legal practice was 
controlled by the courts. In the 1850s, the fi rst inroads into this model came with 
the foundation of the University of Sydney Law School. Th e university in each state 
followed suit, with Queensland being the last when the University of Queensland 
established its Faculty of Law in 1935.52
By 1962 the transition from apprenticeship to university-based legal education 
had advanced signifi cantly. A government report into the future of tertiary education 
(the Martin Report in 1965) found that the majority of lawyers in most states were 
university graduates.53 Up until the 1970s, the law schools emphasized doctrinal 
study delivered in large part by legal practitioners and supplemented by a very small 
number of legal academics.54 Th e 1960s and 1970s saw a signifi cant expansion in 
the number of law schools55 and a signifi cant increase in government funding that 
enabled the establishment of a cohort of full-time legal academics. In addition to 
attaining a critical mass, the new academics were imbued with the enthusiasms of 
the time—critical studies, feminism, and generalized radicalism. Th is development 
was not necessarily welcomed by the profession or by the courts. As the president 
of the New South Wales Bar Association and later judge of the New South Wales 
Supreme Court complained: 
In the whole of Australia … there are only one or two academic teachers of any real 
value in real property, in contracts or in torts, yet there are about seventeen [sic] law 
schools. Th ere are, to be sure, multitudes of academic homunculi who scribble and 
prattle relentlessly about such non-subjects as criminology, bail, poverty, consumerism, 
51. David Bamford took the lead in preparing this section.
52. Nikolas J James, “A Brief History of Critique in Australian Legal Education” (2000) 24:3 
Melbourne U L Rev 965 at 967.
53. Michael Chesterman & David Weisbrot, “Legal Scholarship in Australia” (1987) 50:6 Mod L 
Rev 709 at 711.
54. Ibid.
55. In 1960, there were six law schools; by 1986, there were thirteen.
(2013) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL178
computers and racism. Th ese may be dismissed from calculation: they possess neither 
practical skills nor legal learning. Th ey are failed sociologists.56
Despite such attitudes, law schools continued to develop as genuinely academic 
institutions with a broader perspective of their role than they had when legal education 
was largely an apprenticeship. In 1987, the Commonwealth Government commissioned 
the Pearce Report57 into legal education. Th e Pearce Report has infl uenced the 
development of legal education ever since. It recommended continuation of the 
new approach to legal education with its emphasis on critical analysis of law, 
encouragement of new teaching methods, and the development of skills teaching. 
It also recommended increased government funding for law schools and warned 
against the establishment of any new law schools.58 While there is clear evidence 
to suggest that the fi rst three recommendations have been adopted by many, if not 
most, Australian law schools, the latter two recommendations have been ignored. 
Th e number of law schools has grown from twelve in 1987 to thirty-fi ve in 2011 
and law continues to be one of the lowest funded disciplines.
By the 1990s the divide between the legal profession and legal education 
had become almost complete. Th e dominant route to legal practice was through 
an accredited law degree provided by a university, followed by a period of 
professional legal training delivered by either universities (leading to a graduate 
diploma in legal practice) or specially created training institutions (e.g., the Leo 
Cussens Institute in Victoria and the College of Law in New South Wales). 
Western Australia still allows for professional legal training through articles of 
clerkship with a lawyer.
While direct involvement by the legal profession in the delivery of legal 
education may have ended, the legal profession continues to exercise great 
infl uence over legal education. Recent reviews of legal education recognize that 
“the requirements of practice a[re] the dominant criterion for determining what 
should be taught at law school. Th e legal profession has exercised and continues 
to exercise considerable control over what is taught at law school, and has in 
the last decade indicated its desire to exercise a greater degree of control.”59 
56. R Meagher, “How Can You Learn Practice in Th eory?” Proceedings and Papers of the 7th 
Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong (1983), cited in Chesterman & Weisbrot, supra 
note 53 at 716.
57. Professor Dennis Pearce, Professor Enid Campbell & Professor Don Harding, Australian Law 
Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth (Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1987).
58. Eugene Clark, “Australian Legal Education: A Decade after the Pearce Report” (1997) 8:2 
Legal Educ Rev 213.
59. Mary Keyes & Richard Johnstone, “Changing Legal Education: Rhetoric, Reality and 
WALKER ET AL., THOUGHTFUL PRACTITIONERS 179
Th e universities enjoy considerable autonomy in determining curriculum and 
pedagogical approaches for their degrees, but the degrees need to be accredited 
by the authorities controlling admission to legal practice. Th e constitution 
and procedures of these authorities vary from state to state, but they are for all 
practical purposes controlled by the senior judiciary and lawyers in each state. 
In the early 1980s the Council of Chief Justices formed a committee chaired 
by Justice Priestly called the Consultative Committee of State and Territory Law 
Admitting Authorities (the Priestly Committee) to develop uniform admission 
standards. By the early 1990s, the committee recommended that to obtain accreditation 
a law school’s curriculum would need to cover eleven areas of required knowledge. 
Th ese areas were the core doctrinal areas (e.g., torts, property, and contract) with 
two procedural areas (criminal and civil procedure) and professional conduct (which 
included basic trust accounting). How these were to be taught was not prescribed 
and the content was loosely defi ned. Th e “Priestly 11” (as they came to be known) 
have formed the compulsory core of most law degrees. Some law schools have 
made certain areas of required knowledge optional topics and not prerequisites for 
graduation, but advise any student wishing to enter legal practice that they need to 
ensure they have completed all eleven areas.60 Th e Priestly Committee has expanded 
to include representation from the Council of Australian Law Deans and has been 
renamed the Law Admissions Consultative Committee. It has now also prescribed 
twelve areas of required knowledge for professional legal training courses (although 
these are expressed as required areas of competency). 
As Australia has no external bar examination or other external mechanism for 
assessing whether graduates possess the knowledge required to enter the profession, 
admission authorities have had to be satisfi ed that law schools are delivering this 
knowledge. Th ere continues to be great variation from state to state in the ways in 
which this is done. In some states, law schools are subject to light scrutiny and are 
required only to report signifi cant changes in degrees. In others there is high level 
of scrutiny with periodic reviews that examine everything from assessment schemes 
to subject guides and qualifi cations of teaching faculty. However, the trend over 
the last decade has been for the admission authorities to take a more active role in 
scrutinizing law school curricula. 
Th e advent of mutual recognition of qualifi cations across states in the 1990s 
increased the need for uniformity of standards. In 2008, the Commonwealth 
Prospects for the Future” (2004) 26:2 Sydney L Rev 537 at 555 [citation omitted].
60. Th e law degree at Monash University, for example, describes Civil Procedure as “quasi-
compulsory.” At the University of Melbourne, civil procedure is contained in a fi rst-year 
compulsory subject called Dispute Resolution.
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Government embarked on the creation of a national legal profession project 
with a national legal services board setting admission standards. Th is project has 
faltered because smaller states have opted not to co-operate with the transfer of 
responsibility from states to a national body, but the courts and legal profession 
continue to exercise major infl uence on legal education.
Within this context, civil procedure enjoys a distinctive place. Th e fi eld of 
civil procedure saw the least reduction in the legal profession’s involvement in the 
delivery of legal education. Regarded by many legal academics as being primarily 
a vocational subject, it was delivered in most law schools by legal practitioners. 
Th is continues to be the case in many law schools, but the last fi fteen years has 
seen a steady growth in the numbers of legal academics teaching and researching 
civil procedure. Th e links between the teaching of civil procedure and the legal 
profession continue, but they have evolved. Full-time academics specializing 
in civil procedure often have professional backgrounds, and many part-time 
academics in the fi eld continue to have a role in legal practice. 
Traditionally civil procedure was taught as the study of the rules of court 
with students learning the mechanics of procedure. More recently, civil procedure 
courses have included broader dispute resolution topics, including the functions 
of civil courts, the values underpinning civil procedure, ethics of litigation, and 
facilitating access to justice. 
Given its close relationship to the profession, it is somewhat surprising that 
the greatest challenge to the future of civil procedure as an academic subject now 
comes from the courts and the profession rather than from academia. When the 
Priestly Committee fi rst drafted its uniform admission standards in the 1980s, 
civil procedure was not one of the recommended areas of required knowledge. 
While it was included in the fi nal report on uniform admission requirements 
in 1992, this has been challenged. As recently as 2010, the Law Admissions 
Consultative Committee considered dropping civil procedure as a required area 
of knowledge in the law degree to make space for new areas of required knowledge 
(e.g., statutory interpretation). While these deliberations were not public, it is 
possible that the committee might have been infl uenced by the fact that one 
of the required areas of competency for the professional legal training stage is 
civil litigation practice. Th e committee might have thought that this required 
area of competency would adequately include the teaching of civil procedure. 
Yet, as will be discussed in Part II, the role of civil procedure teachers in the 
broader process of civil justice reform has been increasing. Th e development of 
a pool of legal academics with research interests in civil justice and litigation in 
particular is becoming a valuable resource for government and courts. Whether 
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the exposure of graduates to civil procedure in their legal education has encouraged 
broader engagement with civil justice reform is more diffi  cult to ascertain.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE TEACHING OF PROCEDURE ON CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM 
Having canvassed the varying relationships between legal education and the 
profession in the four jurisdictions, as well as the role that the teaching of civil 
procedure might play in those relationships, we now turn to the implications for 
civil justice reform as it occurs in each country.
A. CANADA: A MODEL OF BROADLY-BASED ENGAGEMENT61
Making allowances for the diff erences in scale, the processes of civil justice reform 
in Canada are not too dissimilar from those in the United States. As one of two 
legal advisors to the Federal Courts Rules Committee (Rules Committee),62 the 
author of this section outlines that process as it occurs in Canada’s Federal Court, 
which may be taken to be representative of a broadly-based engagement between 
the courts, the profession, the public, and academics specializing in procedure.
As a preliminary note, it should be observed that the Federal Court63 in Canada 
has a diff erent mandate from that of its counterparts in Australia and the United 
States. Lacking pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it has a statutory jurisdiction 
that specializes in key areas of law assigned by the Constitution to the federal 
government of Canada, including maritime law, intellectual property, Aboriginal 
law, and immigration. Th is means that there are specialist bars in these areas that 
have a particular interest in practice before the Federal Court that makes them 
keen interlocutors in developing reforms. It also means that many members of the 
provincial bars across the country will only occasionally have proceedings in the 
court, thereby heightening the signifi cance of regular communications to keep the 
profession apprised and engaged with recent developments and emerging issues of 
practice and procedure. In other respects, the following process is not unlike that 
which occurs in reforming the rules in the provincial superior courts. 
Reforms of the Federal Court’s rules of procedure usually begin with issues 
identifi ed by courts in judgments or by communications with the court by members 
61. Janet Walker took the lead in preparing this section.
62. One advisor for the common law, and one for the civil law.
63. Or, to be more precise, Federal Courts because the separate Tax Court and Court Martial 
Appeals Court are also Federal Courts.
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of the profession. In some cases, these reforms emerge as signifi cant reviews of an 
area of practice, such as occurred in recent years in the areas of expert evidence and 
summary judgment, but in other cases the reforms are of a more discrete nature. 
In still other cases, the general evolution of practice before the Federal Court, as 
has occurred in recent years through advances in technology, will occasion an 
audit of the rules to ensure that they refl ect current practice. Finally, periodic 
comprehensive reviews of the rules are pursued, as occurred in 1998 and as is 
currently underway, to identify areas of proactive reform that may be warranted 
to ensure that the rules best facilitate the practice in the court.
Th e discussion of potential projects for reform usually begins in one of the 
biannual plenary meetings of the Rules Committee, which consists of a number of 
judges and prothonotaries of the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal, 
key members of the court staff  together with representatives of the specialist bars 
that most frequently appear before the court, and the two academic advisors. Th e 
preliminary discussion of a potential area of reform may be introduced by a member 
of the Rules Committee or it may be based on a brief introductory discussion paper. 
Should the Rules Committee support the further consideration of potential reform, 
a Sub-Committee is usually established to study the matter further and develop 
with the legal advisors a more formal discussion paper for broader consultation. 
Th is will often involve research into recent reforms in the area in other jurisdictions 
and into any pertinent academic commentary.64 Th e discussion paper will identify 
a series of key issues for reform, sometimes including sample drafting language to 
illustrate the options that might be considered. Th e discussion paper will usually 
be reviewed in the next plenary meeting and then posted on the court’s website and 
distributed through established lines of communication with the relevant sections 
of the bar associations. Following a period of forty-fi ve to sixty days for input, the 
Sub-Committee and the legal advisors review the comments of members of the 
public and prepare a follow-up report on them for the Plenary Committee together 
with recommendations for the direction the reforms might take. 
Once the Rules Committee is confi dent of the nature of the reforms it wishes 
to pursue, the Sub-Committee and the legal advisors prepare instructions for the 
legal drafters and jurilinguists to prepare draft rules. It should be noted here that 
the entire process is bilingual. During the plenary meetings, members of the Rules 
Committee intervene in either French or English, the materials for the meetings 
64. For examples of such discussion papers, see Federal Court (Canada), Court Process and 
Procedures, “Rules,” online: <http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/
Rules>.
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including the various discussion papers, minutes, et cetera are provided in both 
offi  cial languages and, perhaps most signifi cantly, the jurilinguists ensure that the 
draft rules not only fi t with the language in the existing rules but also match each 
other in their eff ect. Th is is just one sense in which the process of rules reform 
in the Federal Court is a model of engagement between those with specialized 
knowledge: legal advisors familiar with developments in other jurisdictions and 
having experience in the way in which the rules fi t within the broader context 
of procedural values, jurilinguists adept in identifying the nuances of particular 
words and providing expert advice on language, and judges and practitioners 
experienced in the practical eff ect of the particular cast of the rules on litigation 
in their matters. In many ways, the Rules Committee is a striking exception to 
the adage that it is not possible to draft in committee; many meetings include 
animated and productive debates about very specifi c questions of proposed rules.
Once the draft rules are prepared, a Regulatory Impact Assessment is prepared 
and posted together with the proposed new rules on the Federal Court’s website 
and distributed widely for a sixty day period of notice and comment. In some 
reform projects, this is also a period of time in which representatives of the Rules 
Committee hold meetings with interested members of the bar to discuss the 
proposed reforms and solicit their input. Th e results of this consultation process 
sometimes give rise to the need for further refi nements and the process is extended. 
Otherwise, the reforms are fi nalized and the new rules formally published.
It may be diffi  cult to verify the precise impact of the teaching of procedure 
as a required subject in the basic law degree. However, the process in Canada 
of reforming the Federal Court’s rules of civil procedure demonstrates a level of 
engagement with members of the profession, members of the public, and members 
of the legal academy that refl ects a broad understanding of procedure and the 
potential for reform that would seem unlikely to exist in the absence of a good 
grounding in civil procedure throughout the profession. 
Rules reform is only one part of the larger process of civil justice reform in 
Canada. Two other kinds of civil justice reform warrant mention for the way in 
which they evince a continuing and productive exchange between the profession 
and the academy. Th e fi rst kind of reform is one in which a perceived need for 
change in the profession prompts a dialogue with legal educators about the law 
school curriculum. As was noted in the earlier discussions of the accreditation of 
US and Canadian law schools in Part I of this article, there is no ongoing process 
of setting and monitoring compliance with detailed standards for legal education in 
Canada. However, from time to time, as with the emergence of a need to improve 
the availability of alternative forms of dispute resolution and the need to ensure 
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lawyers have a solid grounding in issues of ethics and professionalism, the law 
society has consulted with the law school administrators in the province to assess 
the current curricular standards and, where appropriate, to encourage change. In 
the absence of formal processes and standards for accreditation, this consultation 
process has historically been a voluntary one, but it has fostered change. 
Th e second kind of reform is the more comprehensive civil justice reform 
project undertaken periodically upon the emergence of a demonstrated need for 
change. Such projects have been completed in recent years in British Columbia, 
Alberta, Ontario, and Québec. Th e notable feature of these projects is the broadly 
based involvement of members of the profession that they feature. In contrast with 
the Royal Commissions described in this article’s discussion of civil justice reform 
in England and Wales, these comprehensive reforms have involved a number of 
participants and engaged a range of perspectives that would only seem possible in 
the context of a profession that is universally well-grounded in the basic principles 
of procedure. Again, it is diffi  cult to pinpoint the precise correlation between the 
teaching of procedure and the nature of the consultation process that it brings 
about. An awareness of the signifi cance of the various issues raised and an insight 
into the various options available and the impact of potential reforms, however, 
would likely be possessed by more than just those with direct experience with the 
aspects of procedure aff ected only if all members of the profession had the opportunity 
to develop an appreciation of the issues as part of their basic law degree.
B. ENGLAND AND WALES: REFORM FROM ON HIGH AND FROM OUTSIDE65
In England and Wales, the civil justice system is regulated at two levels. Th e 
administration of justice and jurisdictional structure more broadly is to be found 
in a series of Acts of Parliament.66 Th e more detailed rules of court are contained 
in a series of Statutory Instruments, written by statutory Rules Committees.
Procedural rule-making in England and Wales has been, at least since 1833, 
the preserve of the judiciary.67 Th e power to make the rules is today granted by 
65. Andrew Higgins took the lead in preparing this section.
66. See e.g. the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK), c 54, s 1- 2; County Courts Act 1984 (UK), c 28, s 1; 
Civil Procedure Act 1997 (UK) c 12, s 1. Th e Civil Procedure Act 1997 brought in the reforms 
recommended by the Woolf Report. See also Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK), c 4.
67. Th e Civil Procedure Act 1833 “authori[zed] eight of the Common Law judges to make rules 
for the reform of pleading.” See William Hazlitt Smith, “Rule-Making Authority,” Book 
Review of Th e Rule-Making Authority in the English Supreme Court by Samuel Rosenbaum 
(1917) 3:1 Cornell LQ 28 at 28. Sir Jack Jacob has stated:
Th ese rule-making powers were fi rst conferred in 1833 on the Judges of the Superior Com-
mon Law Courts in relation to pleadings only, but of course, since then, the powers have been 
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act of Parliament to a committee whose membership includes the Head and 
Deputy Head of Civil Justice; two or three judges of the Senior Courts; a Circuit 
Judge; one or two district judges; a Master; three persons with Senior Courts 
qualifi cation, including one with experience of practice in county courts; three 
persons authorized to conduct litigation in the Senior Courts, including one with 
experience of practice in county courts; and two persons with experience in and 
knowledge of the lay advice sector or consumer aff airs.68
Th e extent to which the making of procedural rules is mostly left to the 
judiciary and legal professional classes in England and Wales has been considered 
by many to be one of the fundamental features of the English civil justice system. 
Indeed, the preponderant importance the judiciary has in determining the content 
of the entire fi eld of civil procedure has historically placed England and Wales 
far apart from their European neighbours and their transatlantic interlocutors. Th e 
American academic Samuel Rosenbaum’s description of the history and mechanisms 
of English rule-making in his 1917 book on rule-making69 was referred to in the 
United States mostly in order to bolster the case for the Rules Enabling Act mechanism 
of creating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure70 in opposition to unwieldy codes of 
procedure written directly by the legislature.
In England itself, many of the reforms to the court systems introduced during 
the nineteenth century were partly71 the result of a self-conscious emulation or 
comparison with the all-encompassing, theory-heavy legal systems of other European 
considerably extended to the whole of practice and procedure and other specifi ed proceedings 
and branches of the law and to all courts and tribunals. Such extension began with the Supreme 
Court when it was created by the Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875. Th e Rules of Court so made 
relating to all courts and tribunals thus comprise an authoritative, extensive and wide-ranging 
corpus or body of civil procedural law, which to some extent may be regarded as the English 
equivalent of much of what is contained in the European Codes of Civil Procedure.
 Jack IH Jacob, Th e Fabric of English Civil Justice (London, UK: Stevens & Sons, 1987) at 53 
[citations omitted].
68. Civil Procedure Act 1997, supra note 66, s 2.
69. See Smith, supra note 67.
70. Clarke B Whittier, “Regulating Procedure by Rules of Court” (1927) 11:1 J Am Judicature 
Soc’y 15.
71. Some interesting rhetorical references to other nations appear in Lord Brougham’s 1828 
speech. See Henry Brougham, “Speech on the Present State of the Law. Delivered in the 
House of Commons, February 7, 1828, Volume 2” in Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham, 
Upon Questions Relating to Public Rights, Duties, and Interests; With Historical Introductions, 
and a Critical Dissertation Upon the Eloquence of the Ancients (1838) (Edinburgh: A & C 
Black, 1838) 302 at 412-13.
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nations. Th e reforms insisted on theorizing and rationalizing civil procedure (and 
other fi elds of law) and had academically-founded, legislative rule-making at their 
heart. Although it is now conventional to ascribe the reforms of the nineteenth 
century to the “theoretical spark”72 provided by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, 
who did indeed seek rationalization and simplifi cation of the law, his vast infl uence 
was mostly indirectly exercised and only ever acknowledged post facto. Sir Jack Jacob 
himself, in a speech premised upon “the growing acceptance of civil procedural law 
as a subject for academic study and research,”73 emphasized that civil procedure “is 
par excellence a subject of practical importance, and precisely for this reason lawyers 
ought to be in the vanguard of its reform.”74
In recent years, however, a series of constitutional reforms has led to a partial 
reconsideration of the power to make rules of civil procedure: “Th e Civil Procedure 
Act 1997 (CPA 1997), and more recently the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, 
sought to regulate rule making in procedure and place it on a sounder statutory 
basis.”75 Th us “the CPR are delegated legislation, made by the CPRC under the 
authority conferred by the CPA 1997, ss.1 and 2. … Rules made by the CPRC 
must be submitted to the Lord Chancellor, who may allow, disallow or alter rules 
so made.”76 Th e most notable absence in the statutory provision for a standing 
committee devoted to the review and amendment of the rules of civil procedure 
is that of academics in the fi eld. On occasion, individual academics may be heard 
pursuant to the Civil Procedure Act, which requires that the CPRC “consult such 
persons as they consider appropriate.”77 But this is not a regular occurrence. It is 
far more common for the Rules Committee to respond to judicial comments in 
published judgments about specifi c rules and their consequences. In some cases,78 
72. Sir Jack IH Jacob, Th e Reform of Civil Procedural Law (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1982) at 207.
73. Ibid at 1.
74. Ibid at 4. 
75. Adrian Zuckerman, “Rule making and precedent under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998—
still an unsettled fi eld” (2010) 29:1 CJQ 1 at 2.
76. Ibid.
77. Civil Procedure Act 1997, supra note 66, s 2(6).
78. See e.g. Hodgson and Others v Imperial Tobacco Ltd, [1998] 1 WLR 1056 at 1069, All ER 
673 (CA), citing Sir Jack Jacob as the presumed author of a note in Th e Supreme Court 
Practice; A, B and Others v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust In the Matter of the Nationwide 
Organ Group Litigation, [2003] EWHC 1034 at para 7, 3 Costs LR 405 (QB), citing work 
by Professor Adrian Zuckerman referred to in the Woolf Report; Leigh v Michelin Tyre Plc, 
[2003] EWCA Civ 1766, [2004] 1 WLR 846 at para 24, citing an article by Professor John 
Peysner on cost estimates. See also the discussion of a point made in Professor Zuckerman’s 
2003 book on civil procedure in Akram v Adam [2004] EWCA Civ 1601, [2005] 1 WLR 
2762 paras 37-43; Adrian AS Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (London, UK: LexisNexis, 2003).
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references that are made in argument to a commentator’s note may lead to 
judicial discussion.
Procedural reform in England, in actual fact, does not take place for the 
most part through the day-to-day changes in individual rules or blocks of rules 
by the Rules Committee. Writing in 1974, Sir Jack Jacob identifi ed a pattern 
that has guided virtually every eff ort at reform of civil justice and procedure 
from the nineteenth century to his day: 
[W]hen suffi  cient interest or pressure was aroused for changes to be made and could no 
longer be stemmed, the government of the day would decline to form its own political 
judgment as to whether any and if so what reforms should be made. Such a question 
would be removed from the area of party politics; and the government would profess to 
be interested but neutral about the problems of change. It would accordingly set up a 
commission or committee consisting mainly of judges and of members of the legal pro-
fession, with an occasional sprinkling of lay members, to enquire into the problem, and 
to make recommendations as to what changes were necessary or desirable, with terms 
of reference which were generally limited, though quite often implicitly contain-
ing a hint or two as to the general direction of change. Th e commission or committee 
would take “evidence” from interested bodies and persons, and then publish its report 
with its recommendations for changes to be made. Th e government of the day would 
consider the report and its recommendations, and would adopt or adapt such of them as 
it thought fi t and would implement such recommendations by proposing the necessary 
legislation in the form of statute or statutory Rules of Court. Th ereafter a pause would 
ensue, as though the legal profession and the system of civil justice required to absorb 
the new changes and adapt themselves to the new conditions. Th e pattern has thus been, 
commission or committee – report and recommendations – legislation – pause. Almost 
every single change made since 1800 to this day in the organisation of the civil courts 
and in civil procedure has followed this pattern.79
Royal Commissions can be defi ned as “ad hoc independent committees, 
appointed by the government—ostensibly by the monarch—for a specifi c 
investigatory and/or advisory purpose. After they report, any further action 
must be taken by the Executive or Parliament.”80 Th ey are variously praised for 
having “signifi cant eff ect on the outcome of the policy-making process,” and 
criticized for being “essentially undemocratic regardless of their outcomes.”81 
79. J Jacob, ‘Civil Procedure since 1800’ in Th e Reform of Civil Procedural Law (London, Sweet 
& Maxwell 1982) at 209.
80. Barbara Lauriat, “Th e Examination of Everything: Royal Commissions in British Legal 
History” (2010) 31:1 Stat L Rev 24 at 25. According to Lauriat, the zenith of Royal 
Commissions “corresponded with a period when utilitarian, rationalistic ideals of law reform 
prevailed” (ibid at 27).
81. TJ Cartwright, Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees in Britain: A Case-Study 
in Institutional Adaptiveness and Public Participation in Government (London, UK: Hodder 
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Th is method of proceeding has continued to be used uninterruptedly to the 
present day with regard to the reform of civil procedure,82 with the Woolf Report83 
and Jackson’s recent review of civil litigation costs.84 Th is may be due in part to the 
absence of a permanent review body concerned with civil procedure on a level more 
general than the necessarily technical approach taken by the Rules Committee. In turn, 
reform by episodic “commission – report and recommendation – legislation” steps 
leads to a consequently uneven opportunity for relevant academic analysis and input 
into the process. Indeed, a blunt comparison of the introductions to Lord Woolf ’s 
and Lord Justice Jackson’s respective reports demonstrates the vast diff erences between 
approaches, interest, or desire to acquire an academic perspective into the problem at 
hand, and even the diff erences in the personality of these judges. Both conducted long, 
though eventually limited, consultation exercises in England and other jurisdictions. 
Lord Woolf specifi cally relied on work done by academics, including an international 
conference held in Florence.85 Lord Justice Jackson, who had participated in Lord 
Woolf ’s survey, resorted to an international fact-fi nding tour in which a Task Force 
travelled the world in search of insight from abroad. Additionally, he had meetings 
and follow-up correspondence with a number of important academics in the fi eld 
and relied on work done at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford.86 He relied 
particularly on empirical and law and economics research (much, though not all, of it 
transatlantic) relating to the diff erent costs rules and litigant behaviour.87 
Th e diff erent style of research and evidence gathering (and, consequently, outlook) 
demonstrates the major failing with this type of reformist endeavour. Th e research, and 
the scope of the enquiry, is necessarily piece-meal and dependent on the individual in 
charge. Neither judge, in short, was able to take advantage of the breadth of research 
and continuous analysis that, say, the Law Commission could provide. Th e Law 
Commission was created in 1965 as an independent statutory body “to keep the law 
under review and to recommend reform where it is needed.”88 Whether by inattention 
or by design (possibly because it was convinced that the Rules Committee would fulfi ll 
& Stoughton, 1975) at 3; AP Herbert “Anything but Action” in Ralph Harris, ed, Radical 
Reaction: Essays in Competition and Affl  uence (London, UK: Hutchinson, 1961), cited in 
Lauriat, supra note 80 at 35.
82. Sometimes Commissions whose terms of reference did not comprise civil procedure saw fi t 
to recommend the immediate establishment of commissions dedicated to that goal. See JA 
Jolowicz, “‘General Ideas’ and the Reform of Civil Procedure” (1983) 3:3 LS 295 at 295.
83. Woolf, supra note 33.
84. Jackson, supra note 34.
85. Woolf, supra note 33, Introduction.
86. Jackson, supra note 34 at 6-7, 101, 344-45, 347.
87. Ibid at 499-502.
88. Law Commission, Home, online: <http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/index.htm>.
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that function with regards to civil procedure), the Law Commission did not decide, 
upon its inception, to deal with civil procedure.89 
However, partly to remedy this omission, the Civil Justice Council was established 
under the Civil Procedure Act 1997.90 It is an advisory body sponsored by the Judicial 
Offi  ce whose functions include “keeping the civil justice system under review, 
considering how to make the civil justice system more accessible, fair and effi  cient, 
advising the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary on the development of the civil justice 
system, referring proposals for changes in the civil justice system to the Lord Chancellor 
and the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, and making proposals for research.”91 And 
while the statutorily required composition mirrors that of the Rules Committee, two 
of its members as of 2011 (term expiry in January and April 2012) were professors of 
law (respectively with expertise in class actions and in socio-legal research) in prestigious 
UK universities. Th ere is much to be hoped for from the coming of age of the Civil 
Justice Council as a possible substitute or alternative to Law Commissions or permanent 
advisory bodies in other jurisdictions. Professor John Anthony Jolowicz has identifi ed 
as one of the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice “the 
lack of general ideas or legal philosophy, so characteristic of Anglo-American law, which 
gives us petty tinkering where comprehensive reform is needed.”92 In order to have 
great ideas it is necessary to have an informed knowledge of the totality of the fi eld. A 
continuous, consistent review of the law surely is the best way of achieving such a result. 
C. THE UNITED STATES: A MODEL OF CONTINUOUS ENGAGEMENT93
Th is section is about those processes of civil justice reform in the United States in 
which the author of this section happens to have been signifi cantly involved. About 
six decades ago, Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt of New Jersey observed that civil 
justice reform is “no sport for the short-winded.”94 Th e author wholeheartedly agrees 
with this observation.
89. Th is was apparently a “great disappointment” to Sir Jack Jacob. See “Sir Jack Jacob Q.C. 
1908–2000” (2001) 20 CJQ 79 at 79. 
90. Civil Procedure Act 1997, supra note 66.
91. Ibid, s 6.
92. Jolowicz, supra note 82 at 298.
93. Th omas D Rowe Jr took the lead in preparing this section.
94. Arthur T Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration: A survey of the extent to 
which the standards of the American Bar Association for improving the administration of justice 
have been accepted throughout the country (New York: Law Centre of New York University for 
the National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949) at xix.
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1. THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND RULE-MAKING: THE 
ROLE OF CONGRESS
Given American federalism, civil justice reform takes place by many means. It 
can vary of course from time to time, but also considerably from state to state. 
In some states such as Florida, for example, the state constitution as written or 
judicially interpreted imposes signifi cant separation-of-powers limits on the state 
legislature’s authority to make rules for state courts.95 By contrast, in New York 
and California the legislatures have long been unquestionably involved in writing 
state procedure codes such as the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules96 and the 
California Code of Civil Procedure.97
Looking at the federal court system, Congress is the metaphorical eight 
hundred-pound gorilla of changes in federal court jurisdiction and procedure.98 It 
exercises virtually sole power to determine the jurisdiction of federal courts. It does 
so sporadically, as it did when it expanded federal courts’ jurisdiction over state-law class 
actions in the Class Action Fairness Act of 200599—an ideologically-contested action, 
but one of unquestioned constitutionality as far as the author of this section knows. 
Additionally, it also dictates procedure in the federal courts, as it did when it stiff ened 
pleading standards for some securities-fraud class actions in the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act100 of 1995, which also dealt with substance and jurisdiction. 
Congress can also engage in episodic eff orts to determine the jurisdiction of federal 
courts. One example of such an eff ort is the Congressionally-created Federal Courts 
Study Committee of 1989–1990, which produced numerous recommendations,101 
some of which Congress enacted into law.102
95. See e.g. Jeff rey A Parness, “Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking,” (1979) 88:6 Yale LJ 
at 1319.
96. NY CPLR (McKinney 2013).
97. Cal Civ Proc (West 2013).
98. See e.g. Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 465 (1965). In this case the US Supreme Court stated that 
“the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and 
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though 
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of 
classifi cation as either” (ibid at 472). For the Necessary and Proper Clause, see US Const art I 
§ 8, cl 18. 
99. Pub L No 109-2, 119 Stat 4 (codifi ed in 28 USC).
100. Pub L No 104-67 109 Stat 737 (codifi ed in 15 USC).
101. See US Department of Justice, Federal Courts Study Committee, Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee (April 1990), online: Federal Judicial Center <https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffi  les1/Digitization/124270NCJRS.pdf>.
102. Pub L No 101-650 104 Stat 5113 (codifi ed in 28 USC).
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2. THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND RULE-MAKING: 
THE RULES ENABLING ACT PROCESS 
Congressional action with respect to matters of more or less pure procedure in the 
federal courts is not frequent (although threatened in recent years perhaps more often 
than in the past). Congress has delegated the lead role in making and amending 
procedural rules for the federal courts to the United States Supreme Court (USSC), 
which acts based on recommendations from a pyramid of advisory groups. Five 
Advisory Committees—on rules of Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy Procedure, 
Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence—generate recommendations 
that are vetted by both an umbrella Standing Committee and public comment and 
hearings. Th e Advisory and Standing Committees are appointed by the Chief Justice 
of the United States and consist of a majority of federal judges with representatives 
from the practising bar, academia, the federal Department of Justice, and the state 
courts. Th ey are served by non-voting Reporters, invariably academics, who are in 
charge of preparing draft proposals and commentary thereon.
When they are fi nally approved by the Standing Committee, recommendations of 
Advisory Committees are considered by the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
the formal organization of the federal judiciary with representatives from the federal 
appellate and trial courts.103 If approved by the Judicial Conference, recommended 
rule changes go before the USSC, which usually but not always adopts them; they 
take eff ect some months afterward if not vetoed, stayed, or changed by Act of 
Congress.104 So the process involves the USSC acting in a legislative role under 
a delegation of power from Congress. A possibly signifi cant limit on this rule-
making power is that under the Rules Enabling Act, the rules adopted by the USSC 
may not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”105 Congress itself is 
under no such limit, since its powers (even though not plenary) include legislating 
with respect to both procedure and substance. While the USSC has never given 
signifi cant teeth to the substantive-rights limit on the rule-making process, the 
rule makers themselves are mindful of it.
Th e process just described is lengthy but transparent, with considerable input 
from interest groups and individual practitioners, academics, and judges.106 Th e 
103. See 28 USC § 331 (2006). Th is statute establishes the Judicial Conference and enumerates 
its powers and duties.
104. For a fuller description of the process for amending Federal Rules, see James C Duff , 
“A Summary for the Bench and Bar” (2010), online: <http://www.uscourts.gov/
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx>.
105. 28 USC § 2072(b) (2006).
106. Indeed, the length of the process means that sometimes when a minor mistake has 
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process is regularized and ongoing, with greater activity at some times than others, 
but not highly sporadic. It is somewhat politicized but less so than when Congress 
becomes involved, and more politicized than it was some decades ago. As a member 
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 1993 to 1999, the author of this 
section was impressed with the process (although not always agreeing with its 
outcomes), while being struck and somewhat surprised by the level of discontent 
in the civil procedure academy about the process and its product. Impetus for 
rule amendments comes from varied sources: the Advisory Committee’s own 
considerations, academic scholarship, and suggestions by individual judges and 
practitioners. Congress decides not to proceed on suggestions (which are often 
trivial, bad, or biased) at a fairly high rate, but signifi cant responses to problems 
large or small are still perceived as genuine.
3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS
One signifi cant factor bearing on American federal civil justice reform is empirical 
work. Th e Rules Committees sometimes commission empirical studies of both 
patterns in litigated cases in areas regarded as being of concern, and of eff ects of 
recent revisions. Th e Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center, the education 
and research arm of the federal judiciary, is one signifi cant source of such research. 
Another is the Institute for Civil Justice of the RAND Corporation, an independent 
think tank. In general, empirical legal studies—including studies of procedural 
matters—is an area of increasing focus for legal academia and for non-legal 
academics interested in the legal system.107 Not all rule revisions are based on 
empirical research or subjected to empirical evaluation, but empirical work does 
play a signifi cant part.
4. OTHER INPUTS TO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
Again, American civil justice reform is highly multifaceted. Many other bodies such as 
the American Law Institute (a law-reform organization that consists of practitioners, 
judges, and academics and that is not limited to civil-justice matters)108 and the 
American College of Trial Lawyers (an organization of experienced litigators)109 
been made, it is easier to fi x it by getting a bill through Congress than by processing a 
recommendation for amendment to the USSC.
107. See e.g. the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, launched in 2004.
108. See American Law Institute, “Overview,” online: <http://www.ali.org/index.
cfm?fuseaction=about.overview>.
109. See American College of Trial Lawyers, “President’s Message,” online: <http://www.actl.com//
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home>.
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generate law-reform proposals. Some of these proposals are infl uential in actual rule 
or statutory reform while others may infl uence judicial decisions without being 
enacted into positive law. Other bodies proposing civil justice reforms include the 
Sedona Conference,110 which produces proposals for best practices concerning 
preservation and discovery of electronically stored information. Bar groups are also 
active in generating studies and recommendations on procedural and other legal 
topics; the ABA takes positions on a considerable range of matters, for example. 
And the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, to mention just one other 
example, has a long-standing reputation for careful, relatively disinterested study 
of problem areas and possible reforms.
5. PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM BY SECTORS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION
Stepping back from particulars about sources of procedural reform eff orts, a 
common characteristic of such eff orts in the United States is that they tend 
to involve considerable participation by all major legal sectors, including the 
practising bar, the bench, and the academy. In particular, the scribes—those 
generating draft proposals and explanatory material—are usually academics. Th e 
bodies passing on the recommendations usually have large majorities of practitioners 
and judges, although professors are sometimes also voting members of these groups. 
Th e actual adoption of proposed reforms, of course, is by governmental bodies 
such as the federal Congress, state legislatures, or courts acting in legislative roles 
usually under power delegated by the legislative branch, but in some states inherent 
or constitutionally conferred authority.
D. AUSTRALIA: REFORM OF THE RULES VERSUS REFORM OF THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM—A STUDY IN CONTRASTS111
Th e experience in Australia has highlighted the distinction between the reform of 
the rules of civil litigation and the reform of the civil justice system as a whole. 
Civil procedural reform in Australia has rarely been contentious. Most of its 
two-century history has been one of incremental change controlled by the courts 
through their rule-making powers, often transplanting procedural changes from 
elsewhere. Major revisions of the rules of the court have not been undertaken 
lightly and rules of court have often remained largely unchanged for three or four 
decades at a time. However, recent years have seen more reform. Th e Federal Court 
110. Online: <http://www.thesedonaconference.org/>.
111. David Bamford took the lead in preparing this section.
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Rules 1979 were replaced by the Federal Court Rules 2011.112 Th e South Australian 
Supreme Court Rules 1947 were replaced with the Supreme Court Rules 1987 and 
more recently by the 2006 Supreme Court Rules.113 Th e New South Wales Supreme 
Court Rules 1970 were repealed in large measure by the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 2005.114 And the Victoria Supreme Court Rules 1986 were replaced by the 
Supreme Court Rules 2010.115 
For Australia, the question of the relationship between the teaching of civil 
procedure and civil justice reform is diffi  cult to ascertain. While the evolution of 
civil procedure as an academic discipline has been discussed in other articles in 
this issue,116 the process of civil justice reform, and particularly civil procedure 
reform, is much less clear.
Across the nine Australian jurisdictions, with few exceptions, the process of 
regular review and updating of civil procedure is opaque. Most procedural reform 
is accomplished through amendments to civil procedure rules, punctuated 
infrequently with major revisions of the rules. Unlike the processes in Canada 
and the United States, these amendments are largely the result of the work of 
small groups, overwhelmingly comprised of judges, who usually deliberate among 
themselves without public consultation. Th ere are two models for procedural 
reform operating in Australia. In the fi rst, the legislation that establishes the 
court empowers the judges of the court to make rules governing the practice 
and procedure of the courts. Th is is the case, for example, in the Federal Court 
of Australia, and the Supreme Courts of South Australia, Victoria, and Western 
Australia.117 In most cases, the legislation provides that rules changes require the 
support of the majority of the judges, although in South Australia it provides that 
any three or more judges are authorized to make procedural rules. 
In the second model, the legislation establishes a Rules Committee with 
broader representation. New South Wales and Queensland have adopted this 
model, although in Queensland the rule-making power is vested in the Governor 
in Council upon recommendation by its Rules Committee. Both New South Wales 
and Queensland have adopted uniform rules of civil procedure for all levels of 
courts of general civil jurisdiction and their Rules Committees have representatives 
from the various courts. New South Wales also includes two legal practitioners 
112. Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), s 1.03.
113. Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA), s 1.07; Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA), s 7. 
114. Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
115. Supreme Court Rules 2010 (Vic), s 1.
116. See supra note 1.
117. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 59; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 72; Supreme 
Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 26; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 168.
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in its Supreme Court Rules Committee that co-exists with its Uniform Rules 
Committee. Th e legislation in Tasmania also provides for a rules committee that 
includes four legal practitioners, although the formal power to make rules is vested 
in the Supreme Court judges. Like Queensland, the judges are constrained by the 
legislative requirement that any rules proposed by the judges must be recommended 
by the Rules Committee. 
From a practical perspective, the diff erence between the two models is not 
great. Even where rules can be made only on the recommendation of a Rules 
Committee, the lay members of all existing Rules Committees are signifi cantly 
outnumbered by judicial and court offi  cials. Furthermore, most of the courts with 
no legislative requirement for a Rules Committee have, in fact, created advisory 
Rules Committees that include representatives from the practising profession, 
and occasionally departmental offi  cials. South Australia has the Joint Rules 
Advisory Committee for example, and each of the Victorian courts has created 
advisory committees.118 
Th e work of procedural reform, whether undertaken by these committees or 
the judges themselves, is done largely in private. Th e process is not confi dential per 
se, but the procedures, agenda, deliberations, and membership of the committees is 
either not publicly available or it is not easily accessed. Many practitioners learn of 
procedural amendments only upon implementation of the amendments.
It is clear from this description of the processes for procedural reform that there 
is little scope or role for academics specializing in civil procedure. Given the limited 
role of the practising profession, it is hardly surprising that no provision is made for 
academic involvement. Th is is not a criticism of the courts. Until recently there has 
not been strong academic engagement in the fi eld of civil procedure more generally. 
Most law schools employed practitioners to teach civil procedure and only in the last 
fi fteen years has there been a real growth in academic interest in the fi eld.
However, the process described above refl ects the ordinary incremental reform 
of procedure. In the last twenty years, the widespread perception of the need for 
urgent reform has led to major reviews of civil procedure with completely fresh 
procedural rules emerging as a result. Th ese initiatives have often originated outside 
the courts, and have been advanced by legislatures or government departments, often 
as part of a broad law reform process. In Queensland, the government created a 
Litigation Reform Commission in the early 1990s, the Western Australia government 
asked its Law Reform Commission to review criminal and civil justice in 1997, 
118. Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review Report (Melbourne: Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, 2008) at 698-700, online: <http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/
default/fi les/VLRC%2BCivil%2BJustice%2BReview%2B-%2BReport.pdf>.
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the Commonwealth government asked the Australian Law Reform Commission 
to conduct an inquiry into the federal civil justice system in the late 1990s, the 
New South Wales government created a Uniform Rules Working Party in the 
early 2000s, and the Victorian Government asked the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission to conduct a review of civil justice in 2006. 
Th e process these inquiries adopted was generally very similar. Researchers were 
appointed or engaged, public submissions were sought and encouraged, discussion 
papers or proposals were developed, wide consultation on the proposals took 
place, sometimes major conferences were organised, and eventually a report with 
proposed reforms was provided to the government.119 Th is aff orded considerable 
opportunity for civil procedure academics to contribute to the formulation of 
the proposals for reform. In many cases the commissioners of the relevant law 
reform commission included legal academics and, in the case of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission Inquiry, much reliance was placed on research by legal 
academics into procedural law and practice. With the most recent Victorian Law 
Reform Commission review, a leading practitioner turned academic, Professor Peter 
Cashman, was appointed to head the review. In this way, although the reform of 
particular procedures in the litigation process has traditionally been seen as within 
the purview of the courts themselves, the reform of the civil justice system as a 
whole has involved much more broadly based initiatives.
Th ere is a further way in which procedural scholars have contributed to the 
process of civil justice reform—through their involvement with independent 
research centres. However, the success of research centres focusing on courts 
and their processes has been inconsistent. Organizations such as the Australian 
Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA) have active research agendas that 
promote academic research into justice issues including procedural reform. For 
a long time hosted by the University of Melbourne, the AIJA has recently moved 
to Monash University. In New South Wales, the Civil Justice Research Centre did 
excellent work in the 1990s, but lost its main funding in the early 2000s. Th e Law 
and Justice Foundation in New South Wales has continued to promote research 
into justice issues more broadly. Th e University of Wollongong Centre for Court 
Policy and Administration provided graduate courses in court administration and 
promoted research until it closed around 2000. However, all these bodies provided 
avenues for academic research into civil procedure, which was regularly relied upon 
by the various Law Reform Commission inquiries. 
119. For details of the process, see e.g. Australian Law Reform Commission, Managing Justice: A 
Review of the Federal Civil Justice System (ALRC Report 8) (February 2000) at 63-64, online: 
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/fi les/pdfs/publications/ALRC89.pdf>.
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Th e foregoing description of academic involvement in procedural reform 
raises questions about its overall impact. It would appear that the direct input of 
academics into procedural reform is largely limited to episodic involvement in 
major public reviews of litigation occurring outside the normal rule-making process. 
Is this, then, the true extent of the impact of teaching procedure on civil justice 
reform in Australia? Perhaps it is not. Although it is a long term consideration, it 
is reasonable to anticipate that the procedural issues and values considered in law 
schools will come to infl uence the thinking of the next generation of judges, and 
thus the rule makers of the future. It is to be hoped that instilling in these next 
generation judges the notion that good procedure enables courts to deliver their 
important public functions with integrity and legitimacy in an evolving world 
of social regulation, and dispute resolution will help to ensure that they will be 
motivated and equipped to adapt procedure to meet the challenges of the future. 
And, to the extent that the process of reform comes to involve a larger sector of 
the profession, it is to be hoped that they will be similarly motivated and equipped 
to contribute.
III. CONCLUSION
Does the approach taken to the teaching and learning of procedure infl uence the 
way in which practising lawyers conceive of their professions and their need to be 
mindful of how it might best function to serve the interests of the public? Does 
the expectation that all new members of the profession will engage with core 
procedural values by acquiring an academic grounding in the law help to ensure 
that they will be more thoughtful practitioners? Does it make them more mindful 
of the need to seek ways to maintain public confi dence in the legal profession and 
so to justify preserving its status as a self-regulated profession? 
Moreover, does the approach taken to the teaching and learning of procedure 
infl uence the way in which civil justice reform is pursued? Does the widespread 
engagement of law students with core procedural values in an academic setting 
support a more continuous and broadly-based engagement with the challenges 
of civil justice reform? 
Th ese are complex questions to be sure and they do not readily admit of 
answers that can be verifi ed in a statistically measurable fashion. Nevertheless, 
the combined eff ect of the refl ections of the authors of this article has provided a 
compelling account of the links that might be drawn between the academic study 
of procedure and an engaged legal community committed to serving the interests of 
the public. It remains to be seen whether such links might be recognized by those 
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responsible for determining the relationship between the study of procedure and 
admission to the profession, and those responsible for determining the subjects 
regarded as appropriate for the academic study of law. 
To the extent that such a link may appropriately be drawn, the two topics 
considered in this article—the state of the profession and civil justice reform—might 
warrant further refl ection in the reverse order. Recognizing the means for ensuring 
that the profession continues to provide leadership in the pursuit of reform in times 
of changing needs in the larger community may be critical for those who value 
the practice of law as a self-regulated profession to maintain public confi dence 
in the profession, and with it the foundation for support for self-regulation. We 
hope that these articles will make a contribution to further discussions of these 
important issues.
 
